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Mihaela Mihai, University of Edinburgh 
From Hate to Political Solidarity: The Art of Responsibility 
Abstract 
Hate is currently enjoying the status of summum malum within the common sense of constitutional 
democracies. Hateful acts are criminalised and hate speech tests the limits of our commitment to 
free expression. This paper shifts focus away from hate speech and crime and towards the 
structural conditions that normalise various verbal and physical forms of violence. Building on 
insights from feminist and race critical theory and the sociology of power it points the reader’s 
attention to three important dimensions of structural violence only partially captured by the legal 
definitions hate speech and crime: the linguistic, the emotional and the embodied. It then sketches 
a proposal about the forms of political solidarity we should stimulate as prophylaxis against hate 
and argues that certain artworks can reveal and confront the naturalised social, political and 
cultural hierarchies that underprop – and sometimes erupt in – hate speech and acts. A case study 
serves as illustration. 
Key words 
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Introduction 
Hate is currently enjoying the status of summum malum within the common sense of constitutional 
democracies. Hateful acts are criminalised and hate speech tests the limits of our commitment to 
free expression. Legislation and the state’s coercive force are employed to make sure that 
toleration – and not hate – wins the day.  
In the last few decades, many scholars have criticised the overwhelming academic and political 
preoccupation with hate as speech and crime. They have argued that conceptualising hatred 
narrowly, i.e. as the individual emotion behind speech and crimes, is reductionist, and that 
politically focusing on hate crime and speech while ignoring their structural roots is myopic. Two 
types of critique emerged. On the one hand, some have proposed an expanded notion of emotions 
as stretching beyond the individual psyche and body, either as identity-building forces that include 
relations between individuals and communities1 or as composite assemblages that materialise in 
                                       
1 Sara Ahmed, “The Organisation of Hate,” Law and Critique 12 (2001): 345–365. 
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texts, laws, buildings, weapons, fences, border controls, and so on.2 On the other hand, a second 
camp has argued that, rather than seeing hatred as the abnormal, pathological reaction of a single 
individual, we have to contextualise hate speech and crime within pervasive cultures of racism, 
sexism, classism, ableism, xeno-, homo- and transphobia that mar liberal democracies.3 Often 
imperceptible patterns of injustice – ingrained in the liberal state’s institutions, the market and the 
public culture – inform the systematic infliction of various forms of violence against second-class 
human beings. Hate speech and crime are just two such forms among many.4  
In this paper I start in agreement with this second camp and take up their invitation to shift our 
focus away from hate speech and crime and towards the structural conditions that normalise 
various verbal and physical forms of violence against certain groups, affecting their status as 
members of the moral community. I try to supplement their account in two ways. First, I 
complexify the conceptualisation of oppression with insights from social and political theory, and 
in particular from feminist and race critical thought and the sociology of power. Building on these 
literatures, I point the reader’s attention to three important dimensions of oppression that are only 
partially captured by the concern with hate speech and crime: the linguistic, the emotional and the 
embodied. Based on this revised account of oppression, I then move on to sketch a proposal about 
the forms of political solidarity that could be stimulated as part of a prophylactic project against 
hate. Taking the medical metaphor further, I argue that we need to shift our attention from the 
treatment of symptoms to the prevention of the chronic disease: what we are looking for is not a 
medicine for hate speech and crime, but a vaccination of the body politic against stereotypical 
negative visions of the different other, and unreflective indifference regarding the historical 
reproduction of patterns of injustice and violence. If criminal law – the state’s weapon of choice 
against hate speech and crime – is a blunt instrument when it comes to promoting inclusive 
solidarity, if the liberal state itself practically functions with differentiated categories of human 
worth and individuals internalise and embody arbitrary social norms, how can democracies 
challenge the naturalised structures of oppression underlying hate speech and hate crimes? How 
can they make the historical and cultural roots of hate visible? And how can they provoke 
reflection, emotional responsiveness and sensuous knowing in the larger public? In other words, 
how can democracies defuse hate speech and crime and cultivate habits of solidarity? 
                                       
2 Birgitte Schepelern Johansen, “Locating Hatred: On the Externalization of Emotions,” unpublished manuscript on 
file from author. HAS THIS BEEN PUBLISHED? 
3 David Theo Goldberg, “Afterword: Hate or power?” in Hate Speech, ed. Rita Kirk Whillock and David Slayden, 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage1995), 267–276; Barbara Perry, “A Crime by Any Other Name: The Semantics of ‘Hate’,” 
Journal of Hate Studies 4 (2005/2006): 121–137. 
4 Violence is one of five markers of structural oppression for Iris Young. See Iris Marion Marion, “Five faces of 
oppression,” in Multiculturalism from the Margins, ed. Dean Harris (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1995), 65–86. 
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The second contribution this chapter seeks to make is to argue that, unlike criminal law, certain 
works of art are particularly suited to reveal, problematise and confront the naturalised social, 
political and cultural hierarchies that underprop – and sometimes erupt in – hate speech and acts. 
This is not to diminish the institutions’ and social movements’ role in redressing historical and 
structural oppression, but to point to artworks’ potentially complementary and sophisticated 
contribution to a solidary democracy. The public education system, as well as awareness raising 
campaigns initiated by civil society actors, are a liberal’s obvious suggestions for cultivating a 
modicum of solidarity. Fundamentally, transformative political processes aiming to redress 
systemic injustices – political, economic, cultural – need to be initiated to ensure the 
institutionalisation of a democratic system worthy of its name. However, this paper takes a step 
back and focuses on a different instrument. It proposes that certain artistic products are 
particularly well suited for focusing citizens’ attention on previously unnoticed aspects of social 
reality and, due to their mediatedness, for providing a safe and propitious space for uncomfortable 
processes of reflection to unfold. In addition, artworks do not engage spectators only 
intellectually. They can also stimulate them sensorially and emotionally in a way that discloses 
individuals’ complicity in the reproduction of oppressive politics. Building on insights from 
aesthetics, I propose that an artwork’s addressing a multitude of individual faculties – imagination, 
memory, understanding, emotion, as well as the body – makes it a particularly fruitful means for 
highlighting the historically continuous connection between structural oppression and hate. 
Moreover, under certain circumstances, artistic products can enable the cultivation of forms of 
solidarity between citizens. While toleration has been hailed as the antidote to hate within liberal 
democratic societies, I propose that a certain notion of solidarity constitutes a more suitable 
political virtue. The solidarity we are looking for acknowledges the historical endurance of 
oppression, is understood as an open-ended, ever inclusive process rather than a final 
achievement, and resists thick notions of identity. 
The first section will reconstruct arguments by scholars who invite us to leave behind the myopic 
focus on hate speech and crime as individualized, isolated, and emotionally charged occurrences 
and instead look into the structural conditions – reproduced across generations – that inform 
systemic patters of violence. I challenge the notions of language, emotion and embodiment 
presupposed by hate speech and crime laws. I draw attention to language as a repository of unjust 
categories, to emotion as the anchor of undemocratic habits and to the body, both as a site of 
oppression and as complicitous with oppression. Building on a variety of contributions in critical 
theory, the second part turns to theorizing the kind of responses needed to neutralize the structural 
sources of hate in language, emotion and the body and build solidarity. I then attempt to delineate 
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an account of how certain artworks can have a transformational effect on the ways in which we 
relate as citizens. Last but not least, a case study will give concreteness to the theoretical positions 
advanced here. Exhibit B, the controversial show by Brett Bailey (2014), provides an exemplary 
test case for how artworks can, under certain circumstances, reveal the limits of a focus on hate 
and successfully – if uncomfortably – illuminate the pervasiveness and historical continuity of 
oppression.5 At the same time, Exhibit B is an excellent illustration of how disorienting and 
disruptive aesthetic experiences can – not uncontroversially – attempt to cultivate habits of 
political responsibility and solidarity.   
Beyond Hate as Speech and Crime 
In the last few decades, numerous scholars have challenged lawyers’, legal theorists’ and social 
scientists’ myopic focus on hate speech and crime as the summum malum of our age. 
Disenchanted with the psychologising and individualising account of hate privileged by 
perspectives from criminal law, they have sought to thematise the underlying social dynamics that 
sometimes manifest themselves in hateful speech or crime, but which are not exhausted by them. 
For such accounts, reducing the problem to hate is misleading in that we obscure culturally 
complex patterns of oppression that inform hate speech and crime, but also a myriad of other 
exclusionary practices, norms and institutions. The experience of verbal or physical violence by 
individuals belonging to certain groups is not merely the result of a pathological affective reaction 
of a deviant.6 Hate speech and crime are two of the many expressions of power asymmetries and 
violence that target racialised, sexual, ethnic or religious groups at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy. Reinterpreted against the background of a societal common sense that arbitrarily 
ascribes differential value to various classes of individuals, instances of hate speech and crime no 
longer appear as the result of irrational or deviant feeling but rather, as the highly visible upshot of 
differential categories of social identity. Therefore, focusing exclusively on evident abuses in 
word and deed is a non-starter for those who hope for broader processes of social change and a 
future of political solidarity.7 
In what follows, I problematize three important elements that enter into the legal discourse on hate 
speech and crime and propose alternative visions thereof, visions that take into account the 
                                       
5 For an introduction to the show, see BBC, “Exhibit B: Edinburgh's controversial art show,” accessed October 18, 
2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/12ynxPVNKF1pYVrzZB9R2sM/exhibit-b-edinburghs-
controversial-art-show.   
6 “A Crime by Any Other Name,” n. 3. 
7 Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser and Cornel West are just some of the most prominent voices in the ongoing 
debates over structural injustice in political theory. For some emblematic contributions by these authors, see Iris 
Marion Young, Responsibility for Injustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Cornel West, Race Matters 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) and Nancy Fraser, The Fortunes of Feminism (London: Verso, 2013). 
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systemic nature of oppression. Language, emotion and the body will discussed in turns to show 
their role in sustaining tiered notions of human value within democratic societies, beyond easily 
identifiable instances of hate speech and crime. 
Language 
Typical of hate speech regulations within constitutional democracies, the UK Public Order Act of 
1986 stipulates that 
A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays 
any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence 
if— 
(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or 
(b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up 
thereby.8 
 
The law uses a notion of “speech” as speech acts or modes of behaviour that are either intended to 
stir racial hatred or that are likely to do so even if not intended as such. The offence is 
individualised, has a clearly identifiable perpetrator and a clearly identifiable victim who is a 
target because of certain dimensions of her identity: skin colour, race, nationality (including 
citizenship), ethnic or national origin, religion, or sexual orientation. 
Such an account of the power of speech to harm individuals misses the fact that language itself 
reproduces the hierarchical visions of humanity underpinning hate speech in insinuations and 
suggestions, in reasoning and representations, in short, in the microexpressions of daily life.9 
First, racial, gendered, sexualised categories of distinction are inscribed in, and reproduced 
through, language. Language is suffused with oppression since it is simultaneously a reflection of 
our unjust world and a force in its reproduction.10 Objectifying, essentialising language causes 
harm by contributing to the maintenance of stereotypical, monolithic and fixed visions of certain 
groups’ identities.11 Linguistic constructions of groups as exotic, criminal, immoral, terrorist, 
fundamentalist, hypersexual, promiscuous, lazy, etc. contribute to the oppression of women, the 
poor and various minorities in more pervasive and less visible ways than hate speech.  
                                       
8 Government of the United Kingdom, Public Order Act 1986, accessed February 11, 2015 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/contents. 
9 David Theo Goldberg, Racial Subjects (New York: Routledge, 1997), 20. 
10 For an emblematic text see Mark Lawrence McPhail, The Rhetoric of Racism Revisited (Lantham: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002). 
11  For two important takes on objectification see Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on 
Pornography and Objectification (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009) and Martha Nussbaum, 
“Objectification”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995): 249–291. 
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Second, individuals enjoy differential authority in the use of language.  One’s use of language 
(slang, grammar, the scope of one’s vocabulary, accent) plausibly constitutes one of the most 
important media of distinction.12 The language that wins the struggle for dominance within a 
political community becomes the official, “natural language”, a process that diminishes the 
authority of all those who do not speak it correctly. Differences in speech reflect the social 
position of the speaker (gender, class, education, or ethnicity) and are symptomatic of the overall 
uneven distribution of various forms of capital: economic, political, or cultural. Those who 
possess sufficient linguistic capital in the official language dominate the political institutions, 
while those who speak what is derogatorily called “popular,” accented or non-literary language 
strive anxiously “to fit” by mimicking the more competent speakers. More often than not, they 
exclude themselves from public debates.13 If they enter deliberations, interventions by the 
marginalised do not carry the same weight as interventions by articulate, politically versed 
individuals enjoying high levels of cultural capital. Moreover, some modes of participation by 
women, by the poor, by non-whites, run the risk of being disqualified for not conforming to the 
standards of rational, dispassionate argumentation.14 Thus, publicly recognised linguistic 
competences and authority are unevenly distributed among the members of the political 
community, disempowering and excluding some from deliberation and political decision-making, 
while over-valuating others’ contributions. 
Some scholars of hate, such as Barbara Perry, have argued that language can be a source of 
empowerment. She has proposed that naming violence in more specific ways (violence against 
women; racist violence, etc.) will bring oppressive patterns into the light. Notwithstanding 
language’s power to provoke semantic shocks and expose injustices through renaming and 
innovative use of concepts,15 the theorist of political change should be weary of placing too much 
trust in its emancipatory potentialities, given the ways in which non-hateful uses of language 
reproduce patterns of social oppression and given the asymmetries of authority in the use of 
language. More importantly for this paper, focusing on the hyper-visible harm of hate speech to 
                                       
12 Pierre Bourdieu is very critical of internalist approaches to language – such as those proposed by Saussure, 
Chomsky or Habermas – because they neglect the socio-historical processes behind dominant languages and are 
oblivious to the different levels of authority associated with different modalities of speaking. In other words, formalist 
accounts of language universalise the capacity to use language without universalising the conditions in which 
language is used effectively. Pierre Bourdieu Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2005), esp. 90–102.  
13 Language and Symbolic Power, n. 12. 
14 Feminist critics of deliberative theories of democracy have highlighted the problem of differential authority. For 
emblematic contributions see Lynn Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory, 25 (1997): 347–376 and Iris 
Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
15 Lara discusses ‘semantic shocks’ as innovative uses of language that move our moral powers by using words in 
radically novel ways. Examples are “the banality of evil” and “totalitarianism”, and “der Muselmann”. Maria Pía 
Lara, Narrating Evil (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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the detriment of a more comprehensive perspective of language’s role in reproducing oppressive 
politics is politically myopic – and problematically conservative because of its myopia. 
Emotions 
The hatred that makes the object of hate speech and hate crime laws is conceptualised as a 
virulent, intense, individualised and easily observable emotion that can lead to violence against 
members of a certain group by virtue of a certain characteristic, arbitrarily endowed with special 
meaning by the agent that instigates hate. The emotion of hate in hate speech and crime is 
understood as psychologically aberrant, pathological, exceptional and irrational, while the harm 
caused by being the target of hate speech is emotional and physical distress.  
The focus on hate obscures the less visible and more pervasive ways in which the emotional 
anchorage of exclusionary ideas of social hierarchies contributes to their stability. Sara Ahmed 
argues that we should not think of hatred in a psychologising, individualising manner – but as 
relational, shared and essential to a community’s exclusionary practices of self-definition.16 It is 
debatable whether we need to forgo accounts of hatred as located in the subject in order to 
understand how they contribute to the reproduction of systemic abuses and exclusions. Individuals 
are socialised to feel in certain ways towards certain groups and, while there is a sense in which 
politically relevant emotions fuel collective actions and identities, it is not immediately obvious 
that a rethinking of their ontological status is in order. After all, individuals can dissent 
emotionally in relation to their group’s identity. What we need to do is examine the emotional 
dimension of oppression in order to understand how it can prevent the forming of solidarity ties. 
Emotions heighten the salience of arbitrary differences and motivate problematic behaviours 
against subordinate others along racialised, gender, ethnic, religious, sexual dimensions. 
Essentialising and objectifying ideas fuel not just hate, but also fear, contempt, and disgust 
towards the different others, thus contributing to their relegation to sub-human status. The 
contemptible can be dismissed as irrelevant in the public sphere. The disgusting can be shunned 
and be made to feel unwelcome more subtly than through public expressions of hate. Fear 
precludes meaningful engagements with the feared and leads to the separation of the social world 
into isolated islands of complacent comfort. Experiencing emotional discomfort in the presence of 
women, immigrants, sexual minorities, Blacks, ex-convicts or the poor, disables one’s capacity to 
place oneself in their shoes and feel solidary with them.  
                                       
16 “The Organisation of Hate,” n. 1.   
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Within subordinate groups themselves, internalised oppression leads to self-exclusion: 
stigmatisation and stereotyping, lack of training in the practices of politics and lack of 
opportunities to exercise political agency meaningfully are correlated with a lack of trust in one’s 
capacity to do so, translated in the belief that “politics is not for the likes of us!”17 Feeling 
emotionally uncomfortable – intimidated, afraid, ashamed – debating with the more educated, the 
more articulate, more authoritative others might – at least partly – explain why some citizens 
withdraw from political decision-making. Moreover, racialised and classed hyper-visibility often 
makes the non-whites and the poor prefer to become politically invisible. 
This brief discussion shows how emotions such as contempt, disgust, fear, or shame play an 
important role in practices of political exclusion and self-exclusion. The pernicious effect of 
arbitrary categorizations of individuals and their anchoring in the emotional register of both 
dominant and subordinate individuals escape the radar of the hate speech and hate crime 
perspective. While hate makes a proper object of attention for any democratic society, our vision 
needs to be expanded to cover less apparent – yet no less problematic – emotions and their impact 
on the prospects of political solidarity and democratic decision-making processes. 
Bodies 
From within the legal perspective on hate speech and crime, bodily characteristics become salient 
as markers of inferiority in the eyes of the agent of hate. The colour of one’s skin, one’s 
physiognomy, gender or sexual orientation are selected as elements of difference and invested 
with negative moral or political relevance. In cases of hate crime, the body is the target of 
violence, sometimes to the point of annihilation.  
From within the broader perspective of oppression advocated here, the body is politically relevant 
in more complex and subtler ways than the discourse on hate speech and crime would lead us to 
believe. First and foremost, social categories of distinction are embodied. Our body, as much as 
our words, disclose who we are: not just our skin colour, gender and physiognomy, but also our 
clothing, grooming, manners, gestures, bearing, posture, accent are politically relevant. One’s 
position in the social world is inscribed in the body, often beyond the grasp of consciousness, 
explicitness, or deliberate transformation. We “code” and “classify” our fellow citizens – as 
respectable, authoritative, wise, trustworthy or dangerous, stupid, irrelevant, disgusting, 
contemptible, hate-worthy, etc. – according to the features of their embodiment. And such coding 
determines our relationships. Agents whose embodiment is categorised as inferior by the common 
                                       
17 Language and Symbolic Power, n. 12. 
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sense of a society – non-whites, women, sexual minorities, persons with disabilities – are often 
marked for verbal or physical violence in ways that are not reducible to hate speech or hate crime. 
It is not exclusively in instances of hateful attacks that one painfully realises the political 
importance of the body and how one’s own wellbeing is intrinsically related to how the others 
make us feel in our skin: afraid, ashamed, embarrassed or at ease.18 Discomfort in one’s skin is 
reproduced by a variety of unjust attitudes and practices that are likely to target certain bodies 
more than others, limiting their access to public space. The body we inhabit impacts our authority, 
respectability, access, opportunities and relative political power in the social world.  
Secondly, our embodiment is the result of socialisation into oppressive social categories. Feminist 
and critical race theory have provided insightful analyses of embodiment and the way in which it 
manifests reified social roles within a society.19 Individuals internalise rules of physical 
appropriateness, beauty, sexual attractiveness and health, working to sculpt their physique to 
conform to them.  They learn to navigate safe spaces and avoid those where they are unwelcome. 
They adjust to the limits the social world prescribes for their physical existence. These processes 
are not politically insignificant for they preclude meaningful interactions beyond artificial 
differences, with negative consequences for those who feel that their embodied existence is 
devalued.  
The lived experience of embodiment is thus highly complex and an eminently political matter. 
Feeling at home in one’s body is essential for a sense of self-respect and for developing trust in 
one’s power to act effectively in the political world.20  Yet “feeling right” in our own skin is not 
merely a matter of individual self-reinvention and self-acceptance. Nor is it a matter of being 
protected from hate speech and hate crime. It requires intersubjective recognition and political 
inclusion, which presuppose the dislocation of essentialist and objectifying images of the 
embodied other. 
This – admittedly cursory – exploration of the oppression as located beyond institutions in the 
individuals’ language, emotions and bodies, underpins a bleak vision of politics, one of tiered 
                                       
18 See also Alexis Shotwell, “A Knowing that Resided in My Bones: Sensuous Embodiment and Trans Social 
Movement,” in Sue Campbell, Letitia Meynell and Susan Sherwin (eds.) Embodiment and Agency (University Park: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 58–75. 
19 For classic texts see Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto Press, 1986); Iris Young, On Female 
Body Experience: Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Sandra Lee 
Bartky, “Suffering to Be Beautiful,” in “Sympathy and Solidarity” and Other Essays, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 13–29; Sara Heinamaa and Lanei Rodemeyer (eds.), Feminist Phenomenologies: 
Special Issue of Continental Philosophy Review, 43 (2010): 1–140; George Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The 
Continuing Significance of Race (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2008). 
20 For an emblematic take on sensuous wellbeing as a source of power see Audre Lorde, “Uses of the Erotic: The 
Erotic as Power” in Sister Outsider (Berkeley: The Crossing Press, 2007), 53–59. 
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humanity. Given the complexity and historicity of the messy reality underlying and fuelling hate 
speech and acts, political change cannot be brought about only by laws that trigger discrete, easily 
identifiable instances of verbal or physical violence. This paper argues that artworks can 
productively challenge the less-than-obvious linguistic, emotional and embodied roots of hate. 
They can engage citizens intellectually, but also emotionally and physically, in a way that reveals 
and confronts them with their participation in the reproduction of exclusionary hierarchies of 
human beings. Hopefully, such processes of reckoning will constitute the basis of concerted 
political action. However, before delving into a discussion of the transformational potential of 
artistic products, the next section uses insights from feminist theorising to provide an account of 
the practices of political solidarity that should replace essentialist, objectifying and oppressive 
relationships. 
Solidarity: Intellectual, Emotional, Sensuous 
This section proposes that feminist reflection on the issue of women’s solidarity constitutes an 
important, yet unexplored, resource for theorising the practices we need to cultivate in order to 
tackle the linguistic, emotional and embodied faces of oppression and the hateful acts that they 
might underpin. The question of how to build alliances between women who share neither an 
identity, nor a uniform experience of oppression, is one of the most hotly debated topics in 
feminist theory. The main contributors to this body of literature have problematized the nature of 
knowledge and relations that condition the emergence of ties of solidarity. It is in dialogue with 
this literature that I try to draw the contours of a political notion of solidarity. This paper argues 
that prophylactically cultivating political solidarity is a more appropriate and more productive 
strategy than the surgical targeting of hate speech and crime. 
Elizabeth Spelman21, Sandra Lee Bartky22 and María Lugones23 converge in proposing a notion of 
solidarity that takes into account both intellectual-linguistic and emotional elements. They tackle 
the critique that black feminists raised against the myopic, yet universalising, vision of women and 
women’s problems put forth by white feminists from within the narrow confines of their own 
experience and language. The lack of knowledge about the different other is the main reason why 
black women’s systemic oppression is invisible to the privileged white. The solution is, first and 
foremost, about education and information. Spelman advises: 
                                       
21 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (London: The Women’s Press, 
1990). 
22 Sandra Lee Bartky “Sympathy and Solidarity” in Sympathy and Solidarity (Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002), 
69–89. 
23 María Lugones, “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling and Loving Perception,” Hypatia 2 (1987): 3–19. 
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… read books, take classes, open your eyes and ears or whatever instruments of 
awareness you might be blessed with, go to conferences planned and produced by the 
people about whom you wish to learn and manage not to be intrusive...24 
Learning about the other amounts to a practice of apprenticeship, supported by the faculty of 
imagination, which enables both intellectual and emotional connections. Imagination – the 
capacity to make present what is absent – enables us to think, but also to feel our way into the 
world of the disadvantaged, without thereby moulding them to fit the simplistic and stereotypical 
image we already have of them. Emotion accompanies us in entering the world of those marked 
for verbal and physical violence within democratic societies but, in imagining their experience, we 
must first, remain sceptical of the language in which they are represented: 
…given the history of racism and other forms of oppression, be careful about what 
books you buy, what classes you take; think about the limits there presently are on 
what you are prepared to see or hear; examine your own motivations for wanting to 
understand others’ lives.25 
Watchfulness over the use of language is a crucial precondition for interrogating its role in 
reproducing patterns of oppression. Being aware of the limits of what (and whom) I can see and 
hear from within my position presupposes an awareness of the limits of my language and of the 
differential value I tend to ascribe to various forms of speech, some of which I may not even be in 
the habit of hearing.  
Yet grappling intellectually, through language, with the other’s history and experience is only one 
side of the coin: what we need to do is explore the emotions that can make her history salient for 
us. Solidarity presupposes a knowing that has an affective taste, a form of fellow-feeling.26 In 
making the feelings of those marked for violence the object of my feelings, I begin to playfully 
travel in their world.27 A traveller across artificial boundaries of social distinction must not be 
self-important; on the contrary, she must be open to self-creation and self-recreation through the 
encounter, avoiding getting stuck in one particular world or language that feels comfortable. 
Comfort leads to complacency and disables travelling and curiosity. On the contrary, ambiguity, 
complexity and double-edges constitute valuable sources – rather than obstacles. Openness to 
surprises, humility and respectful curiosity are three more features of playfulness, according to 
                                       
24Inessential Woman, n. 21, 178–179. 
25 Inessential Woman, n. 21, 179. My emphasis. 
26 “Sympathy and Solidarity,” n. 22, 71. 
27 “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling and Loving Perception,” n. 23. 
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Lugones. Last but not least, travelling comes with responsibilities: that of attempting to take hold 
of oneself and to examine the possibilities of change available in a certain world.  
For travelling or apprenticeship to be successful in forging solidary relationships, the 
traveller/apprentice must fight her own imperialistic tendencies. Abstaining from the temptation to 
project one’s own essentialising, objectifying image of the other is a precondition of learning 
about, and feeling with, the stereotyped other: 
When simply imagining her, I can escape from the demands her reality puts on me 
and instead construct her in my mind in such a way that I can possess her, make her 
into someone or something who never talks back, who poses no difficulties for me, 
who conforms to my desires much more than the real person does.28  
Maintaining the separateness of persons and ensuring one’s language does not colonise her world 
are two conditions for cultivating non-oppressive ties of solidarity. The temptation to impose a 
pre-existing image onto the other – as opposed to entering their world open to being changed, 
intellectually and emotionally – must be counteracted with a self-relativizing attitude and a 
readiness for both intellectual and emotional self-objectification. 
Spelman, Bartky and Lugones provide us with a wealth of ideas about how solidarity can be 
forged and how the roots of hate can be extirpated long before they bear their poisonous fruit. 
Intellectual and emotional travelling opens up the possibility for non-oppressive forms of 
solidarity. Maintaining a healthy dose of scepticism about one’s language, relativizing it and 
allowing the other to talk back protects us against the unreflective reproduction of oppression 
through the use of arbitrary categories of distinction. Hearing and listening to those I have not 
heard or listened to before is crucial. Travelling emotionally presupposes leaving the comfort of 
my vision and aiming to understand why the other feels the way she does. However, our 
theoretical toolbox is not complete without a consideration of sensuous, embodied learning as part 
and parcel of democratic solidarity building. 
Sensuous knowledge is the knowledge one gets through the experience of one’s body, its pleasures 
and pains, through sensations we can sometimes name and others we have no language for. Our 
bodily experiences are regulated through various norms about normality, health, morality and 
access to space. These norms enable some individuals to feel at ease in their skin and entitled to 
open access to the public sphere, while others – for example women, non-whites, sexual 
minorities, persons with disabilities – are made to experience their body as constraint and as 
                                       
28 Inessential Woman, n. 21, 181. 
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potential target of various forms of violence, hate speech and hate crime among them. Through 
their bodies, they are denied the important experience of safety and control over the world. As 
discussed in the previous section, individuals embody categories of distinction that often relegate 
some to the realm of the sub-human. In order to understand how social change could undercut the 
hateful manifestations of systemic oppression, we need to reckon with the fact that, feeling 
comfortable in one’s body requires a change in the social world and in the practices of assigning 
certain bodies for subordination and violence.29 Any account of solidarity needs to grapple with 
the difficulty of understanding what it means not to be at ease in one’s skin. That is to say, our 
practices of apprenticeship, fellow-feeling and world-travelling must include an awareness of the 
sensorial dimension of experienced oppression, as well as its role in complexifying the loss of 
well-being by those whose bodies depart from arbitrary norms of acceptability or normality.  
Stimulating intellectual curiosity and emotional responsiveness, but also sensuous learning are the 
cornerstones of responsible democratic citizenship in the age of deep pluralism and equally deep 
inequalities and injustices. It is only through a complex encounter with the other in language, 
emotion and the sensorium that openness to transforming oneself and our relationships is possible. 
This chapter argues that, in addition to dealing with hate as speech and crime, political theorists, 
as well as political decision-makers, should worry about how to nurture democratic languages, 
feelings and sensuous ways of knowing. 
But how can political solidarity be stimulated? How can we simultaneously and effectively engage 
individuals’ faculties in ways that steer them away from facile judgments and hatred and towards 
respectful solidarity? This chapter makes a modest proposal arguing that certain artworks can 
foster habits of solidarity. It can make visible and enhance the salience of historically reproduced 
oppression by simultaneously engaging the intellect, emotions and the body. More precisely, I 
propose that the “rich experience” theory of aesthetics provides us with the necessary tools for 
making sense of how certain artworks can nurture the kind of solidarity that any democracy needs 
for its healthy functioning. 
The Art of Responsibility 
Prominent in debates over the so-called “paradox of painful art”30, the “rich experience” theory 
advances the claim that individuals seek aesthetic “experiences that are cognitively, sensorially 
                                       
29 “A Knowing that Resided in My Bones: Sensuous Embodiment and Trans Social Movement,” n. 18. 
30 These debates tackle the paradox of why individuals are motivated to consume painful art. For a quick introduction 
to these debates see Aaron Smuts, “The Paradox of Painful Art,” Journal of Aesthetic Education, 41 (2007): 59–76 
and Jerrold Levinson (ed.) Suffering Art Gladly: The Paradox of Negative Emotion in Art (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2014). 
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and affectively engaging: that is, rich experiences.”31 The learning we get from experiencing 
richly through art is learning about the salience of certain facts about our world: we learn to care. 
In Smut’s terms, “[O]ne might know some fact or another, but not appreciate it. Coming to 
appreciate a descriptive fact is a process of understanding its implications and becoming ready to 
deploy it in future thought.”32  
I propose that learning to care implies the awakening of intellectual, emotional and sensorial 
faculties. More precisely, certain artworks have the capacity to challenge spectators cognitively, 
morally, emotionally and sensuously. Cognitively, through association, juxtaposition, exaggeration 
and many other artistic strategies, spectators can be confronted with new ideas, and be invited to 
see often ignored aspects of human suffering. The limits of the public’s range of concepts, as well 
as the limits of a concept’s usage can be disclosed by poignant artworks. Morally, artworks can 
make apparent the restricted scope of one’s sense of justice and the complexity and ambiguity of 
ordinary moral judgments. Moreover, they can represent exemplars of moral virtue and suggest 
practical ways out of moral conundrums. Emotionally, artists provoke spectators by depicting 
unfamiliar emotions or by associating emotions with unexpected objects. Additionally, artworks 
can represent how it feels to experience the world from a certain position in the arbitrary hierarchy 
of human worth. Sensuously, pleasure and displeasure33 work together to simultaneously seduce 
and reprimand the public into paying attention to obscured aspects of the human condition, 
including the other’s experience of feeling unwelcome in the public sphere. 
Thus, powerful artistic experiences can challenge political, social and cultural boundaries by 
inviting us to intellectually reflect on our own selves, our use of language, our feelings, our 
embodiment, as well as on our relationships with the others, in ways we are not accustomed to. 
They provoke us to travel into the others’ world, thinking and feeling our way into their universe. 
In other words, they open the way for our becoming apprentices to our fellow human beings. And 
yet, because they are about anyone and everyone – and not specifically about us – and because 
they combine pleasure and displeasure in a complex and seductive mix, certain artworks can 
provide us with safe places for a transformative experience that involves revising our own 
concepts and ideas, being emotionally vulnerable, and experiencing physical distress.34 The 
                                       
31 Aaron Smuts, “Painful Art and the Limits of Well-Being,” in Suffering Art Gladly: The Paradox of Negative 
Emotion in Art, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 123–152, at 132. 
32 “Painful Art and the Limits of Well-Being,” n. 31, 134. 
33 Iskra Fileva, “Playing with Fire: Art and the Seductive Power of Pain,” in Suffering Art Gladly: The Paradox of 
Negative Emotion in Art, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 171–185, at 176.  
34Aaron Smuts, “Art and Negative Affect,” Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 39–55. 
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political value of such experiences rests in their opening a space for what Lugones called playful 
world travelling: for learning about the other’s story, her feelings and what it means to be in her 
skin, for reckoning with who we are in relation to her, and for starting the work of rebuilding our 
shared world on different, fairer foundations. 
As our case-study shows, artworks can reveal to a wide audience the experience of not feeling at 
home in a social world and in one’s own body, of being marked for subordination and excluded 
from humanity because of discriminatory categories of difference and their continuity across 
historical epochs. Most importantly for this paper, they can help the audience make the connection 
between such experiences and their own complicity in the reproduction of a social world marred 
by historical oppression, a world punctuated by hate speech and crime.  
This paper humbly proposes that Exhibit B constitutes an excellent illustration of how art can 
serve the prophylactic, solidary-building purpose outlined in the previous sections. The show 
presents several parallel performances recreating scenes of Black oppression, past and present.  It 
was last staged at the 2014 Edinburgh Festival before being cancelled in London. Protesters 
claimed that its white South African director, Brett Bailey, objectified and dehumanized the Black 
actors. The Barbican closed it for security reasons, deploring the blow to artistic freedom. In what 
follows, I propose to read Exhibit B as offering a powerful, rich experience of world-travelling: a 
soul-wrenching, visceral reminder of the very things western publics would rather forget – their 
unsavory colonial past and its continuation into the present.  
Instead of the plaster or stuffed figures of the original human exhibitions in the natural history 
museums of Europe, the visitor is confronted with the dignified, unbearable gaze of the actors, 
who follow the members of the public with piercing eyes. The cast is diverse. Sarah Baartman, 
better known as Black Venus and Angelo Soliman, the African intellectual stuffed for display in 
the Austrian Museum of National History, are probably the best well-known figures that meet the 
visitor and challenge her power to hold their gaze. A Herero woman is presented scraping the flesh 
off the boiled heads of fellow prisoners in a German concentration camp. The heads are thus 
prepared for “scientific” research meant to prove white racial superiority in the universities of 
Europe. Another woman is presented as a sex slave, chained to the bed of a Belgian officer, while 
her husband works for the colonial powers, sapping rubber trees.  
These disturbing scenes were set in the sumptuous Playfair Library at the University of Edinburgh 
– an opulent 19th Century hall. The mini-stages were flanked by shelves heavy with old 
manuscripts and busts of famous white scholars, pointing to the perpetrators and beneficiaries of 
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colonialism and referencing sciences’ complicity with colonial plunder and extermination. Songs 
of sorrow and lamentation related to the genocide of the Nama people in the 1920s at the hands of 
German colonisers – with lyrics in Nama, Otjiherero, Oshiwambo, Tswana and Xhosa – were 
sung by a quartet of singers who played the role of the severed heads in Doctor Fisher’s curiosity 
cabinet. Any illusion that racial humiliation and violence was a thing of the past was discouraged 
by performances representing contemporary racial abuses, mostly related to deportation and 
incarceration: 
Exhibit B is not primarily a work about colonial-era violence. Its main focus is 
current racist and xenophobic policies in the EU, and how these have evolved from 
the state-sanctioned racism of the late 19th century. These policies do not exist in 
historical isolation. They have been shaped over centuries. The dehumanising 
stereotypes of otherness instilled in the consciousness of our ancestors have been 
transmitted subconsciously and insidiously through the ages. Exhibit B demands 
that we interrogate these representations.35 
Political-aesthetic judgments are complex, and the question of who is entitled to speak on behalf 
of whom needs careful and attentive consideration.36 In what follows, I propose a tentative and 
charitable reading of this work as a condemnation of historical oppression and as an alternative 
history, told by its own victims. I write as a white Eastern European woman, working at an old 
university in an affluent western country, i.e. I write from a position of authority and privilege. 
Having seen the performance in Edinburgh and having carefully studied both sides of the debate 
surrounding Exhibit B, I argue that several aspects of the show can help dispel worries about the 
director’s abuse of Black bodies.  
First, local, amateur actors were employed to embody the characters. Stuffed, mummified, inert or 
silent bodies were replaced with live actors who, instead of being the passive target of objectifying 
gazes, turn a critical, confrontational gaze back towards the public. While the actors do not speak, 
the entire setup of the show institutes a reversal of the roles between actor and spectator. The 
spectator is confronted with the scrutinizing eyes of the actor: her movements are watched and 
closely observed as she advances through the gallery from one diorama to the next. The power of 
                                       
35 Brett Bailey, “Yes, Exhibit B is challenging – but I never sought to alienate or offend,” The Guardian September 
24, 2014, accessed February 10, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/24/exhibit-b-
challenging-work-never-sought-alienate-offend-brett-bailey. 
36For a report on the protests against Exhibit B see BBC, “Art show Exhibit B called off after racism protests,” 
September 24, 2015, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-29341361. The 
controversy spilled over to France, where protests were organised against the show. 
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the spectator’s gaze is completely undone and silence enables a visceral – and I would argue deep 
– confrontation with the visitor. Words can be superfluous when the body speaks that loud, i.e. 
when the sensorial encounter is so powerful. For the members of the audience, there is no 
consolation, respite or escape: only a provocation to remember the unsavory past and change the 
present into which they are shown to be complicit. Assimilating the actors to pre-existent images 
of Black passivity and lack of agency is made impossible by these artistic maneuvers. Second, the 
white colonists are not erased from the representation, as some protesters argued. White marble 
busts of white male “notables” flank the performances, staged in an opulent hall within 
Edinburgh’s Old College. I suggest the show could be read as an insertion and affirmation of a 
forgotten, silenced side of history into spaces purged of any reference to Europe’s shameful past. 
It makes present persons who had been excluded from places of knowledge production, persons 
whose exploitation and extermination financed the development of those very places. In other 
words, the show amounts to a denunciatory exercise in historic myth demolition. Thirdly, the 
show featured written testimonies by the actors about their reasons for participating in the project 
– the painful experience of racism being the most prominent – their personal hopes regarding the 
experience of being part of Exhibit B and the politico-didactic impact they anticipated the show to 
have on its audiences. By allowing the actors to “talk back” – literally through testimony, but also 
through lyrical songs, scrutinizing glances, and dignified presence – the director makes it 
impossible for the spectator to colonise the world in which she is travelling. Observed visually by 
the piercing eyes of the actors, moved aurally by the heart-wrenching lamentations of the choir, 
and addressed verbally through testimony, the visitor is the intended target of a message that does 
not allow for easy appropriation and abuse.  
Therefore, I want to cautiously propose that the performances directed by Brett Bayley’ ensemble 
should be read as an intellectual, emotional and sensuous invitation into a shameful and painful 
past for the purpose of examining its continuation into the present and our own complicity in its 
reproduction. Intellectually, the visitor is implicated in a past of oppression and violence, into a 
moral order that dehumanises some and places others at the helm. The show confronts us with the 
abhorrent realities of the colonial past and highlights its concealed prolongation in the present of 
colour-blindness. Colonial atrocities insert themselves in the British public space, a space 
dominated by stories of imperial greatness and featuring minimal reckoning with Britain’s 
participation in the Atlantic slave trade.37 The tableaux vivants representing the situation of non-
                                       
37 For a critical analysis of the apology offered by Tony Blair for British participation in the slave trade, see Michael 
Cunningham, “'It Wasn't Us and We Didn't Benefit': The Discourse of Opposition to an Apology by Britain for Its 
Role in the Slave Trade,” Political Quarterly 79 (2008): 252–259. Also, Emma Waterton and Ross Wilson, “Talking 
the Talk: Policy, Popular and Media Responses to the Bicentenary of the Abolition of the Slave Trade using the 
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whites in today’s Europe challenge the viewer to reflect on the ways in which racialised 
hierarchies and patterns of injustice are not merely a thing of the past that has been overcome, but 
a reality of systemically unjust contemporary democracies.  
Linguistically, the titles of the performances problematise oppression. “Found objects” is the title 
of several scenes that provide the public with reasons to problematize the on-going objectification 
of non-whites in Europe and their exclusion from personhood through public policies and the 
carceral system. By juxtaposing the word “objects” with the pained or angry, unavoidable gaze of 
the actors-subjects, the director seeks to directly shock us linguistically, cause cognitive 
dissonance and emotional discomfort. Language is creatively used to rename people and histories 
in ways that dislocate hegemonic accounts of historical progress and liberal colourblindness. The 
story of the Belgian general’s sex slave is entitled “A place in the sun” – in an attempt to contrast 
romantic western images of colonial lands with the brutal reality of human exploitation and 
annihilation. “Dutch Golden Age,” presents a still life with overflowing bowls of fruit and the bust 
of an enslaved man forced to wear a perforated metal mask covering his face.38 The discrepancy 
between the title – hinting at the self-understanding of former colonial powers – and the brutal 
exclusion of the colonised from humanity, speech and history could not be greater.  
The stories told have emotional resonance. Walking through the show, spectators visibly 
experience sadness, embarrassment and anger at what human beings can inflict upon other human 
beings. Tears are shed. Emotions are stimulated through the mix of powerful performances that 
link the violence of the past to the violence of the present, the strict and alienating control of 
visitors’ movements through the library, and the lamentations of the singers in the Exhibit Quartet. 
The actors face the public with tearfully sad, desperate, angry, resigned or scrutinising 
expressions, never losing eye contact. Reckoning with the sorry state of humanity, past and 
present, cannot be avoided. The spectator/traveller enters the world of the racialised other, is 
pushed to learn from their sorrow and humiliation, and grieve. 
Sensuously, the show confronts the viewer on multiple levels. First, the spectators are closely 
monitored until they enter the main hall of the library. They are required to draw numbers, sit in a 
room full of empty chairs and wait in silence for their turn to enter. An actor aleatorily calls 
numbers, which means groups and couples are broken down into individuals. The spectator is 
                                                                                                                             
'Abolition Discourse',” Discourse & Society 20 (2009): 381–399 and Mihaela Mihai, “When the State Says ‘Sorry’: 
State Apologies as Exemplary Political Judgments,” Journal of Political Philosophy 21(2013): 200–220. 
38 Bailey in John O’Mahony, “Edinburgh’s most controversial show: Exhibit B, a human zoo,” The Guardian, August 
11, 2014, accessed February 2, 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2014/aug/11/-sp-exhibit-b-human-zoo-
edinburgh-festivals-most-controversial. 
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frustrated of any support by friends and family – a move meant to enable individual reflection 
through the direct encounter with the actors’ piercingly uncomfortable gaze. An intimate 
connection is created between the actor-turned-spectator and the spectator-turned-actor, a 
connection that precludes the denial of humanity and dignity. The physical distress of the visitors 
is apparent, many weep. The audience in Edinburgh became visibly uncomfortable in their own 
skin as the show switches roles: the spectators become unskilled, embarrassed actors, moving 
uneasily from one tableau to the next, under the vigilant eyes of the characters.39 
Visitors are challenged to become aware of a shared political myopia regarding the continuation of 
past systemic violence into the present. The wailing of the quartet is the only non-visual stimulus 
and while the languages are not accessible to the audience, the sorrow in their songs is. 
Discomfort is part and parcel of the rich experience Exhibit B provides. Intellectual, emotional and 
sensuous discomfort enables the travelling into the others’ past and present world of oppression. 
Complacency is discouraged through the insertion of contemporary scenes that highlight the limits 
of a focus on hate speech and crime, when vast categories of humanity are relegated to sub-human 
status through migration and criminal law. It is representations of institutionalised human 
hierarchies that preoccupy Bailey and his main interest is to reveal the shadows of the racial past 
into the present of continued oppression. I propose that the show invites the public to recognise 
and affirm the significance of these tableaux as part of a complex picture of continuous political, 
economic, cultural, linguistic and physical oppression, a picture that eludes us if our attention is 
captured by discrete acts of hate speech and crime against specific individuals. 
Exhibit B does not allow out imagination to colonise the world of the different other. The 
separateness is maintained through the cognitive, emotional and physical confrontation with 
representations of realities that we have been blind to or would rather forget. The innovative use of 
language shocks and aims to kick-start processes of reflection. The nature of the atrocities 
represented, the pained gaze – its sadness and anger, i.e. its dignity – the sensorial experience 
combining musical pleasures with physical discomfort, as well as the testimonies of racist 
encounters by the actors impede easy appropriations. Leaving one’s world of linguistic, emotional 
and sensuous comfort and meeting the actors directly opens up the possibility for self and world-
recreation. In engaging a multitude of faculties the performance is apt at enabling apprenticeship, 
fellow-feeling and playful world-travelling, thus contributing to the prefiguration of solidary 
relationships between persons.  
                                       
39 Bailey specifically orchestrated the switch of roles: “The installation is not about the cultural or anatomical 
difference between the colonial subject and the spectator; it is about the relationship between the two. It is about 
looking and being looked at. Both performer and spectator are contained within the frame.” “Yes, Exhibit B is 
challenging – but I never sought to alienate or offend,” n. 35. 
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Conclusions and Potential Criticisms 
This chapter has argued that the focus on hate as the greatest evil plaguing democratic societies is 
misleading and reductionist. In agreement with those who propose a shift in our economy of 
attention from hate to its systemic underpinnings, it has attempted to offer an account of political 
solidarity that could severe individuals’ intellectual, emotional and physical anchoring in an unjust 
social world. Artworks’ transformational potential – their capacity to engage various intellectual 
and emotional faculties as well as the sensorium – has been put forth as a particularly incisive and 
sophisticated instrument for such a complex and difficult political task. Artistic experiences can 
alienate the spectator from her comfortably familiar world and confront her intellectually, 
emotionally and sensorially with an alien world of a different other, which she is invited to 
explore as a respectful traveller. Openness to hearing alternative stories and revising one’s self-
understanding, to feeling the salience of a previously ignored reality and embracing the sensorial 
discomfort of the other as epistemologically valuable – these are the preconditions of cultivating 
non-oppressive relationships. Before concluding, I will address three potential criticisms that 
could be raised against the views presented here.  
First, one might plausibly argue that the account of solidarity advanced here is highly demanding. 
The account of receptivity theorised as part of apprenticeship, fellow-feeling or playful world-
travelling is too trying for the citizens of democratic societies. In response, I would suggest that 
such solidarity-building practices should be welcome and understood as an opportunity for 
learning and building new relationships, rather than as a source of stress. This merely involves not 
shunning literature, theatre, film, or any artwork that might alienate us from our familiar and 
comfortable ideas about the world. Because of their mediatedness and hedonic power of seduction, 
they can provide a safe place for reflection, emotional and sensorial understanding to unfold 
securely, making us aware of the salience of structures of power underpinning hate speech and 
acts.  
Not everyone will respond solidarily to the provocation of artistic products such as Exhibit B. It is 
possible, and indeed to be expected, that some world-travellers might resist entering 
uncomfortable, painful and challenging territories. Being complacent is easier than undergoing 
processes of self-transformation and repositioning in relation to the different others in the social 
world. It might also be the case that backlash will ensue – though the fact that the message 
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combines aesthetic pleasure with painful self-reflection might lessen the possibility of reactionary 
responses.  
The second worry we need to address has to do with the accessibility of such art. Are shows like 
Exhibit B accessible to all citizens or are they targeting the intellectual and cultural elite who is 
already sensitive to issues of structural oppression? The question of accessibility is important as 
the forging of solidarity depends on the uptake by the audience. Before discussing accessibility, 
however, is important to state that we should not assume that the cultural elite is in a privileged 
position when it comes to being aware of the realities challenged by Exhibit B. Beyond this 
obvious fact, two points need to be made. First, that there is a thin line between delicately 
inspirational and too heavy-handed pedagogical art, which can misfire by stifling individuals’ 
imagination, as well as their emotional and sensorial freedom. Aesthetics allows for no clear 
recipes of how rich artistic experiences can be achieved, but there are sufficient exemplars around 
to keep us optimistic about the plausibility of our political proposal. By providing sufficient 
information about the performances to facilitate the reckoning with the salience of the message, 
while allowing visitors to choose how to interact, when and for how long with the tableaux, Bailey 
created an ideal space for a rich aesthetic experience of intellectual, emotional and sensorial 
travelling into a different, unfamiliar world. Secondly, while the show discussed here was 
displayed at a festival usually attended by the cultural elite, it created sufficient controversy to 
make its way into the pages of most media outlets in the UK and Europe generally. Moreover, 
there are plenty of examples of other cultural products that have been more broadly disseminated 
and that escape the suspicion of being addressed only to a small elite. TV series such as Holocaust 
(1978), The Wire (2002–2008) or Shoah (1985) and films like To Kill a Mocking Bird (1960), La 
haine (1995) or Caché (2005) have given rise to important public debates about the complex 
nature of oppression and one’s participation in its reproduction. 
Last but not least, is all art potentially transformative in the way Exhibit B is? The answer is a 
clear no. There is plenty of art that confirms skewed visions of history and that reinforces arbitrary 
differences between groups, obscuring the systemic roots of hate. Notwithstanding pervasive 
myths of artistic independence and subversion, art is part of the social world and it is not immune 
to power constellations. As such, it can be complicit in the reproduction of hierarchical visions of 
humanity. Sufficient internal diversity in the artistic world will, however, ensure spectators’ 
exposure to alternative narratives. Hopefully, artistic products that challenge engrained arbitrary 
habits of thought, emotion and embodiment will provide rich experiences that could potentially 
push democratic societies to more embracing, solidary relationships. The unpredictability of the 
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results is, however, something we have to learn to live with in a democratic society committed to 
pluralism. 
